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When and if the United States chooses to implement a greenhouse gas reduction program, 
it will be necessary to decide whether carbon sequestration policies—such as those that promote 
forestation and discourage deforestation—should be part of the domestic portfolio of compliance 
activities.  We investigate the cost of forest-based carbon sequestration. In contrast with previous 
approaches, we econometrically examine micro-data on revealed landowner preferences, 
modeling six major private land uses in a comprehensive analysis of the contiguous United 
States. The econometric estimates are used to simulate landowner responses to sequestration 
policies. Key commodity prices are treated as endogenous and a carbon sink model is used to 
predict changes in carbon storage. Our estimated marginal costs of carbon sequestration are 
greater than those from previous engineering cost analyses and sectoral optimization models.  
Our estimated sequestration supply function is similar to the carbon abatement supply function 
from energy-based analyses, suggesting that forest-based carbon sequestration merits inclusion 




Land-Use Change and Carbon Sinks: 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Increased concern about the threat of global climate change has brought with it greater 
attention to the possibility of encouraging the growth of forests as a means of removing carbon 
dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere.
1  The Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (United Nations General Assembly 1997) states that parties to the agreement 
(the participating nations) can employ carbon sequestration as part of their portfolios of 
strategies to achieve their domestic CO2 targets.  Hence, when and if the United States chooses to 
implement a domestic greenhouse gas reduction program, it will be necessary to decide whether 
carbon sequestration policies — such as those that promote forestation and discourage 
deforestation — should be part of the domestic portfolio of compliance activities. 
  The costs of carbon sequestration will presumably be one major criterion in that decision.  
Since the late 1980s, it has been suggested that sufficient lands are available to use the approach 
to mitigate significant amounts of CO2 emissions (Marland 1988; and Lashof and Tirpak 1989), 
and claims have been made that such forestry-based carbon sequestration is a relatively 
inexpensive means of addressing climate change (Sedjo and Solomon 1989; and Dudek and 
LeBlanc 1990).  We investigate the cost of supplying domestic forest-based carbon sequestration 
using an econometric model of the revealed preferences of landowners who can use their land for 
alternative purposes. 
 
Previous Studies of the Costs of U.S. Forest Carbon Sequestration 
 
  Three general approaches have been used to estimate the costs of sequestering carbon in 
the United States: bottom-up engineering cost studies; optimization models that allow for 
                                                 
1 After fossil-fuel combustion, deforestation is the second largest source of carbon dioxide emissions to the 
atmosphere.  Estimates of annual global emissions from deforestation range from 0.6 to 2.4 billion metric tons of 
carbon for the period from 1989 to 1995, compared with 5.7 to 6.9 billion tons of carbon annually from fossil-fuel 




behavioral response in the forest and agricultural sectors; and econometric analyses of the 
revealed preferences of landowners.
2 
Most previous studies of the costs of sequestering carbon in the United States have 
employed bottom-up engineering cost analyses or optimization models.  In “bottom-up” or 
“engineering cost” methods, marginal cost schedules are constructed by adopting information on 
revenues and costs of production of alternative land uses on representative types or locations of 
land, and sorting these in ascending order of cost.  In the earliest and simplest of these (Moulton 
and Richards 1990; Dudek and Leblanc 1990; and New York State 1991), the analysts estimated 
available land area, forest carbon accumulation rates, and land and planting costs for 
hypothetical carbon sequestration programs, and thereby derived the total amount of carbon that 
could be captured and the cost per ton of sequestration.
3  In two other cases, the engineering 
approach was modified to include an anticipated increase in agricultural land prices as a 
hypothetical carbon sequestration program expanded, and crop and pastureland were removed 
from agricultural production.  This was done by drawing upon previous (exogenous) estimates of 
the price elasticity of demand for agricultural land (Richards, Moulton and Birdsey 1993; and 
Richards 1997).   
  A carbon sequestration program may increase agricultural land prices, thereby leading 
landowners to convert unregulated forest lands to agricultural land and offsetting some of the 
effects of a carbon sequestration program.  Alig et al. (1997) addressed this issue through the use 
of a two-sector, multi-period simulation model, in which the forest and agricultural sectors were 
linked, and the welfare of producers and consumers in the two sectors was maximized.
4 
  A relatively small number of studies have employed a revealed-preference approach, in 
which actual land-use changes have been analyzed to estimate relationships between land-use 
                                                 
2 For surveys of carbon sequestration cost analyses, see:  Sedjo et al. (1995); Richards and Stokes (2004); Stavins 
and Richards (2005); and Manley, van Kooten, and Smolak (2003). 
3 In a variation on this theme, Parks and Hardie (1995) substituted the estimated foregone net revenues from 
agricultural production for observed sale and rental prices of agricultural land. 
4 Alig et al. (1997) employ the Forest and Agricultural Sector Optimization Model (FASOM).  Adams et al. (1993) 
use a precursor to FASOM to develop marginal cost estimates for carbon sequestration in the U.S.  Later 
applications of FASOM are found in Adams et al. (1999), McCarl and Schneider (2001), Murray et al. (2004).   A 
different simulation model, the ERS U.S. Agricultural Sector Model (USMP), is used by Lewandrowski et al. (2004) 
to estimate the costs of afforesting crop and pasture lands and of other agricultural-sector sequestration activities.   
Our literature review above focuses exclusively on analyses of carbon sequestration in the United States, and does 




choices and relative returns in the forest and agricultural sectors, thereby leading to the 
simulation of carbon-sequestration cost functions (Stavins 1999; Plantinga, Mauldin, and Miller 
1999; and Newell and Stavins 2000).
5  These studies examined the relationship between 
observable historic events (changes in timber and agricultural product prices) and landowner 
responses (conversion of land into and out of forest), and statistically estimated a response 
function.  The models then posited a hypothetical economic stimulus — for example, 
government subsidies for carbon sequestration — and estimated how landowners would respond. 
In theory, there are a number of reasons why landowners’ actual behavior regarding the 
disposition of their lands might not be well predicted by “engineering” or “least-cost” analyses 
(Stavins 1999): (1) land-use changes can involve irreversible investments in the face of 
uncertainty (Parks 1995), and landowners may want to retain options for future land-use 
decisions (Pindyck 1991); (2) there may be non-pecuniary returns (for example, esthetics and 
recreation) to landowners from forest uses of land (Plantinga 1997), as well as from agricultural 
uses; (3) liquidity constraints or simple “decision-making inertia” may mean that economic 
incentives affect landowners only with some delay; and (4) there may be private, market benefits 
or costs of alternative land uses of which an analyst is unaware.  The econometric cost analyses 
have sought to address some of these problems. 
 
Distinguishing Features of the Analysis 
 
  Compared with previous econometric analyses of the costs of carbon sequestration, this 
study is distinguished by three principal features.  First, rather than considering only the 
movement of land between forestry and agriculture, six major land uses are modeled:  forest, 
crop, pasture, range, urban, and a Federally-designated private use, the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP).
6  Accounting for future urbanization is particularly important if it reduces the 
land base available for conversion to forest.  
Second, detailed micro-data are employed that are comprehensive of the contiguous 
                                                 
5 For econometric applications focused on sequestration from changes in agricultural practices, see Antle et al. 
(2003) and Kurkalova et al. (2003). 
6 The CRP, established by the Food Security Act of 1985, is the largest U.S. government program targeting land use.  
The program offers annual rental payments to landowners retiring environmentally-sensitive land from crop 
production under 10 to 15-year contracts and currently enrolls 34.7 million acres, nearly equal to the total area of 




United States  Drawing upon repeated observations of land uses and land characteristics on 
844,000 sample points from the National Resources Inventory (NRI), we observe three land-use 
transitions between 1982 and 1997 for lands encompassing 91% of non-Federal lands in the 
contiguous United States.  Previous econometric analyses have considered relatively small 
regions of the country and have not incorporated micro-data on land-use changes or land quality, 
a critical determinant of land-use decisions.   
Third, key commodity prices are treated as endogenous in the simulations of the carbon 
sequestration supply function.  A national-scale carbon sequestration policy will likely affect 
prices for forest and agricultural commodities, in turn changing the incentives of private 
landowners to convert land to or retain land in forest. 
 
Preview of the Paper 
 
  We model probabilities of transitions among land uses as functions of the anticipated 
economic returns to alternative uses.  A nested logit specification is used for the transition 
probabilities to relax restrictions that are implicit with simpler logit models.  The estimated 
parameters and the respective elasticities are found to be consistent with expectations of 
economic theory.  We find that the probability of a land parcel transitioning to a particular use 
increases as the county-average net returns to that land use increase, after accounting for the 
quality of the parcel. 
We build upon the econometric results by simulating landowner responses to carbon 
sequestration policies, modeled as a combination of a tax on undesirable land-use changes and a 
subsidy for desirable ones.  The simulations are iterative in nature, including feedback effects on 
commodity prices resulting from induced land-use changes. 
A carbon sink model is then used to derive changes in carbon storage associated with the 
sequence of land-use transitions estimated in the land-use simulation model, including forest 
carbon stored in biomass, litter, and soils, emissions associated with harvesting of merchantable 
wood, and agricultural carbon linked with soils and harvested biomass.  Merging the results of 
these simulations with marginal costs numbers associated with the various levels of the 
subsidy/tax leads to the estimated carbon sequestration supply function. 
We compare our estimated supply function with those from previous studies, and find 




considerably greater than those from engineering cost analyses and sectoral optimization models.  
Likewise, at low levels of sequestration, our marginal cost estimates exceed those from previous 
econometric analysis; this relationship is reversed, however, at higher levels of sequestration. 
We also compare our estimates of the marginal costs of carbon sequestration with 
estimates of costs of energy-based carbon abatement.  Here we find that the carbon sequestration 
supply function is roughly similar to the central tendency of the carbon abatement supply 
functions, which suggests that forest-based carbon sequestration merits consideration as part of a 
cost-effective portfolio of domestic U.S. climate change strategies.  For example, if emission 
reductions in the United States on the scale proposed under the Kyoto Protocol were to be 
achieved entirely through domestic actions (forest-based sequestration and/or energy-based 
abatement activities) and with the type of policy incentive considered in this paper, our analysis 
implies that 33% to 44% of the reductions could be met cost-effectively through forest-based 
sequestration.   
  In section 2 of the paper, we describe our econometric analysis of land use.  In section 3, 
we turn to the simulation model, and describe the approach we use to introduce incentives for 
carbon sequestration and to establish a baseline sequence of land-use transitions.  In section 4, 
we present our empirical results, including simulated patterns of land use at the national level 
under both baseline and policy scenarios, the latter estimated for various hypothetical subsidy/tax 
rates. We derive estimated carbon flows resulting from the simulated land-use changes, and the 
associated supply function for carbon sequestration, examine the sensitivity of our results, and 
compare our results with those from previous studies.  In section 5, we conclude. 
 




  Consider a risk-neutral landowner facing the choice of allocating a parcel of land of 
uniform quality among a set of alternative uses.
7  We posit that landowners choose uses to 
maximize the present discounted value of the stream of expected net benefits from the land, and 
that landowners base their expectations of future land-use profits on current and historic values 
                                                 
7 If net returns and the costs of converting land between different uses are approximately linear in land quantity, the 
size of parcels will not affect the relative profitability of land-use options, in which case land-use decisions for a 





8  Given these simplifying assumptions, the decision rule that emerges from 
the related dynamic optimization problem (Lubowski 2002) is to choose the use with the highest 
expected one-period return at time t minus the current one-period expected opportunity cost of 
undertaking conversion.  With K  potential land uses, the owner of a unit of land in use j 
(j=1,…,J) will choose use k at time t if: 
 
   kt jkt jt R rC R − > , (1) 
 
for all alternatives k (k=1,…,K), where Rjt represents the instantaneous expected net benefits from 
a unit of land in use j at time t,  jkt C  is the expected marginal cost of converting one unit of land 
from use j to use k at time t () 0 jjt C = ; and r is the discount rate. 
  The landowner’s profit function may be thought of as including both observed and 
unobserved components.  Specific restrictions on the structure of the unobserved components 
yield alternative specifications of probabilistic models.  An ordinary logit model is one obvious 
possibility, but the assumption of independent disturbances in the simple logit model implies that 
the ratio of the probabilities of any two choices is independent of the other alternatives.    
  We allow for differences in substitutability among alternatives using a nested logit 
specification, which imposes this property of “independence of irrelevant alternatives” within but 
not across specified subgroups (“nests”) of choices.  Dividing the choice set into mutually 
exclusive subgroups s K  (s=1,…,S), we specify  ijkt U , the landowner’s utility from converting land 
parcel i from use j to use k at time t, as the sum of a component,  ijkt V , that is unique to the 
alternative k and another component,  ijst V , that is common to all the alternatives in  s K .  Each of 
these components, in turn, includes an observed component plus an unobserved component 
characterized as a random error. 
  Under assumptions analogous to the standard logit model, the probability of choosing 
                                                 
8 Landowners would expect current values to persist over time if land-use net returns follow a random walk.   
Limited empirical evidence suggests that this is approximately true (Schatzki 2003).  For simplicity, we model land-
use choices as if landowners ignore the value of information to be gained by delaying irreversible decisions.  More 
generally, we assume that landowners do not account for future conversion possibilities when evaluating alternative 
land uses in each time period.  Given the national scope of our study, it would be impossible to model explicitly the 
stochastic dynamic optimization problem faced by landowners (Rust 1987).  However, our econometric approach 
incorporates option values indirectly.  If fixed costs and other irreversible choices introduce rigidities in land use, 




alternative  k  that is grouped in s K can be expressed as the product of two terms: the 
probability, ijst P , of choosing any of the alternatives within s K ; and the conditional probability, 
| ijkt s P , of choosing k given the choice of  s K .
9  For land parcel i starting in use j, the probability of 
choosing land use  s kK ∈ between time t and t+1 is thus: 
 
   |
1 1
exp( ) exp( )
exp( ) exp( )
s
ijst st ijst ijkt
ijkt ijst ijkt s SJ
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= ∑ .  This “inclusive value”
 for nest  s K  equals the 
expected utility for the choice of alternatives within a nest.   The expression in equation (2) 
embodies the first-order Markov property since the probability of the parcel changing use 
depends only on exogenous covariates at time t. 
  Our chosen nesting structure is based on the premise that land uses with more similar 
land quality requirements are closer substitutes.
10  We expect land quality to affect land-use net 
returns principally in terms of agricultural yields, and we measure land quality using the Land 
Capability Class (LCC), a summary measure of the suitability of land for producing crops 
(USDA 1973).  Land in crops has the highest average quality as measured by the LCC, while 
pasture and CRP uses tend to be adopted on higher quality lands relative to forest and range 
uses.
11  Crops, pasture, and CRP uses appear more similar in terms of the land quality required to 
generate a competitive level of returns, compared with forests and range.
12  We incorporate these 
differences in land quality requirements by specifying our nested logit model with three nests:  
                                                 
9 Assumptions of the nested logit model imply that the two disturbances are independent and that their sum has the 
Gumbel distribution (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 2000). 
10 Land quality is only one potential determinant of substitutability among land uses. To the extent that farmers 
operate joint crop and livestock operations, farmers may have skills for pasture and range uses — rather than 
forestry, for example — so crops, pasture, and range uses may be closer substitutes for each other than for other 
uses.  On the other hand, forest and pasture are similar in terms of lower labor requirements. 
11 Assigning values 1 through 4 to LCCs I-II, III-IV, V-VI, and VII-VIII, respectively, the NRI indicates that the 
average qualities in the contiguous U.S. over 1982-1997 were 1.5 for cropland, 1.9 for CRP, 2.0 for pasture, 2.2 for 
urban land, 2.7 for forests, and 3.0 for range, with lower values indicating higher quality. 
12 In the case of CRP, program rules restrict which lands are eligible to participate.  Notably, eligibility is limited to 




K1 (crops, CRP, and pasture); K2 (forest and range); and K3 (urban).  We model urban land use as 
a unique nest, due to its greater degree of irreversibility, and because land quality, as measured 
by the LCC, is likely to be a much less important determinant of urban development returns. 
  Landowners presumably compare net returns to alternative uses on particular parcels.  
Although we have land-use data at the parcel level, we lack parcel-level observations of net 
returns.  Instead, we observe county-level average returns, and so to allow for parcel-level 
variation, we interact the average-return variables for each land use with parcel-level indicators 














jkt β , and
q
jkt β are parameters, Rkc are net 
returns to use k in county c, and
q
it LCC is a dummy variable indicating whether parcel i is of 
quality q at time t.
13  We lack data on the costs of changing land use, but we expect these costs to 




it LCC αα +  in (4), which provide an intercept varying with land quality and initial use. 
  CRP participation depends on a different set of decisions than other land-use choices, 
because enrollment depends on both the landowner’s bid, which includes a proposed rental rate, 
and the government’s choice of whether to accept the bid, which depends on the environmental 
characteristics of a parcel as well as the cost.   Because the program targets cropland, CRP rental 
rates are highly correlated with the profitability of cropping in a given locality.  We account for 
the effect of crop net returns on the incentive to remain in cropland.  Incentives to enroll in CRP 
are specified as a function of LCC, as lower land quality as measured by LCC has always been 
strongly associated with program eligibility.  We would thus expect greater enrollment on lower 




ijkt it ijkt VL C C α αε =+ + for k=CRP. 
   For the component of utility that is constant across the alternatives within each nest, we 
include constant terms for the nest and interactions with the land quality indicator variables.  For 
land parcel i in use j, the component of utility that is constant within each nest is thus: 
 
                                                 












jst γ is a constant specific to nest s and 
jst
q γ  is a coefficient on the land quality indicators.  
Substituting equations (4) and (5) into (2) yields a complete nested logit model for estimation.
14 
 
Econometric Estimation and Results 
 
  We estimate the model using repeated observations of non-Federal land use from the 
National Resources Inventory (NRI) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS).  The NRI is a panel survey of land use and land characteristics on 
non-Federal lands conducted at five-year intervals from 1982 to 1997 over the 48 contiguous 
United States.  Data include approximately 844,000 point-level observations, each representing a 
land area given by a sampling weight (Nusser and Goebel 1997).  We observe land use at each 
sample point in four survey years, providing information on land-use changes over three 
transitions: 1982-1987, 1987-1992, and 1992-1997.  We focus on six land uses: crops, pasture, 
forest, urban, range, and CRP.
15   The land base in our analysis comprises 1.4 billion acres, 
representing about 74% of the total land area and about 91% of non-Federal land in the 
contiguous United States.   Further details on the NRI data are provided in Appendix A. 
  The NRI data reveal the disposition of land units across major uses over time.  Land units 
generally remain in the same use.  For example, of land parcels cropped in 1982, 84.2% 
remained in crops in 1997, while 7.3% had been converted to CRP, 4.6% to pasture, 1.6% to 
urban use, 1.3% to forest, and 0.9% to range.  Of land parcels forested in 1982, 95.4% remained 
in forests in 1997, while 2.5% had been converted to urban, 1% to pasture, 0.5% to crops, 
another 0.5% to range, and 0% to CRP.  The urban land-use category appears to be an absorbing 
state, with lands almost never converted from urban to non-urban uses. 
  Our dependent variable is the choice of land use in year, t+5, at each NRI point, and our 
                                                 
14 For each set of dummy variables (land quality, alternatives, and nests), one category is omitted to permit 
identification.  Another alternative-specific dummy in each nest is dropped in equation (4) to identify the nest-
specific dummies in equation (5).  The dummy for the urban choice enters only in equation (5).  
15 Public lands and transportation infrastructure are excluded from the analysis, as changes in these uses are not 
affected directly by utility maximization by private landowners.  We omit water bodies and barren lands as these 
uses are unlikely to vary over time.  Finally, we exclude lands classified as marshlands and "miscellaneous," 




covariates are the land use in year t, the land quality rating of the point, and proxies for the 
expected net returns from the land-use alternatives as of year t.  To smooth temporary shocks 
from weather and other factors that affect net returns in particular years, we assume that 
landowners use an average of the annual net returns per acre to each land use over the most 
recent five-year period as the basis for their expectations of future net returns.  Denoting each 
year as t, we specify land-use choices observed at time t+5 as a function of the average land-use 
net returns between years t-4 and t, inclusive. 
  By assembling data from a variety of private and public sources, we constructed county-
level estimates of annual net returns (per acre) for crops, pasture, forest, range, and urban uses 
for all 3,014 counties in the 48 contiguous states (see Appendix A for details).  Net return 
estimates are thus constructed for each of our land-use categories, except for CRP, which is 
treated differently, as discussed above.  The estimates for cropland include net returns from 
market sales as well as direct farm program payments.  We report summary statistics on land-use 
net returns in Table 1. 
  We employ maximum likelihood methods to estimate the parameters of the model for the 
transition probabilities from each of four starting land uses (crops, pasture, forest, and range) to 
each of our six ending uses (crops, pasture, forest, range, urban and CRP).
16   We estimate 
versions of the econometric model using data from two different time periods and then compare 
the results.  First, we estimate our model using all observations from the 1992-1997 period, the 
latest transition for which NRI data are available.  These estimates draw solely on cross-sectional 
variation in our independent variables.  If there are variations over time in landowners’ responses 
to economic incentives, possibly the result of permanent changes in factors not modeled by our 
analysis, then parameter estimates based on the most recent data will provide the best foundation 
for predicting future behavior.   
   Second, we estimate the model using a sample of pooled data from each of the three 
available transitions (1982-1987, 1987-1992 and 1992-1997).  For each starting use, we stratify 
the pooled dataset by NRI point and select a random sample that includes only a single 
                                                 
16 Because land virtually never transitions out of urban uses, we do not model these potential land-use changes and, 
for our simulations, assume land parcels remain urbanized with 100% probability.  We estimated the model for lands 
starting in CRP over 1992-1997 only.  Some parcels became eligible to exit the program in 1996, and changed to 




observation of each land unit.
17  In this way, we include observations from each time period, but 
purge the sample of serial correlation due to parcel-specific unobserved effects, which would 
violate the assumption of independent disturbances in the logit model and potentially bias the 
estimates.  The estimated coefficients reflect the average behavior of parcels in each land use 
from 1982 to 1997, weighted by the acreage in each period. If changes in estimated parameters 
over time are due to transient shocks, then estimates based on a longer time period are potentially 
superior for predictive purposes. 
  The results for both the 1992-1997 and 1982-1997 periods indicate good fit of the model, 
and are consistent with the expected economic relationships.
18 For brevity, Table 2 reports 
elasticities, rather than estimated parameters for the twelve equations.
19  For each starting use, 
we report the estimated elasticity for the probability of choosing each land-use alternative with 
respect to the net returns to that alternative (“own return elasticities”).  These elasticities indicate 
the percentage change in the probability of a particular land-use change for a 1% change in the 
corresponding net returns.  In 11 out of 20 cases for 1992-1997 and 14 out of 20 cases for 1982-
1997, the own-return elasticities are positive and significantly different from zero at the 0.01 
level.  In the three cases for each set of estimates where the own-return elasticities are negative, 
they are never significantly different from zero, even at the 0.05 level.  The cross-elasticities (not 
reported) are always opposite in sign to the own-return elasticities.
20 
  The elasticities indicate that landowners starting with lands in either crops or pasture 
responded as anticipated to net returns from alternative land uses.  For land starting in range, the 
own-return elasticities with respect to urban net returns are positive and significant, as well as the 
forest net return elasticity for 1982-1997.  None of the other own-return elasticities (for land 
                                                 
17 In the estimation, we weight the observations to account for whether a particular point remains in the same land 
use for one, two and three transition periods.  We also weight observations using the NRI's sampling weights and, to 
avoid artificially shrinking the standard errors, scale all weights to sum to the total number of observations. 
18 For the transition-specific estimates, pseudo R
2 values (McFadden’s likelihood ratio index) range from 0.68 to 
0.95 and 0.71 to 0.95 for the 1992-1997 and 1982-1997 estimates, respectively.  The positive and significant 
estimates of the inclusive value parameters together with tests (Hausman and McFadden 1984) of a simpler, non-
nested logit model (using the same variables) are consistent with violations of the “independence of irrelevant 
alternatives” hypothesis, supporting the use of the less restrictive nested logit specification.  
19  Parameter estimates are reported in Lubowski (2002), and are available from the authors upon request. 
20 The cross-elasticities are the elasticities of the probability of choosing a particular use j with respect to the profits 
of a different use k.  In the nested logit model, these can be of the same sign as the own-return elasticities when the 




starting in range use) are significantly different from zero, suggesting that rangeland owners are 
relatively insensitive to the profitability of alternative uses, with the exception of urban 
development.  This is reasonable, given that range lands tend to be of the lowest quality and thus 
unsuitable for other agricultural uses. 
  The elasticities with respect to forest net returns are especially important for our 
simulation model of carbon sequestration.  These elasticities are positive, as expected, in seven 
out of eight cases.  While the elasticity is negative for forestlands over 1982-1997, it is not 
significantly different from zero.  The elasticity with respect to forest net returns is positive and 
significantly different from zero for lands starting in crops for both models.  For lands starting in 
pasture and range, the forest net return elasticities are positive for both periods and significantly 
different from zero over 1982-1997. 
  A final econometric consideration is the fact that land parcels located near one another 
may have unobserved characteristics that are correlated across space.  If such characteristics 
influence land-use decisions or if local land-use choices are interdependent, error terms will be 
correlated across space, leading to inconsistent and inefficient estimates in a logit model, due to 
induced heteroskedasticity (McMillen 1992).  We explored the potential importance of spatial 
dependence by eliminating observations near one another.  Estimates with samples that included 
only one point within each of the NRI’s primary sampling units produced results similar to 
estimates including all points, suggesting that spatial dependence is not a critical concern. 
 
3. Simulation Model of Carbon Sequestration 
 
In order to estimate the carbon sequestration supply function, we conduct policy 
simulations and compute corresponding flows of carbon in terrestrial sinks.  We examine a two-
part policy involving a subsidy for the conversion of land to forest and a tax on the conversion of 
land out of forest.  As noted by Stavins (1999), a policy that only subsidizes forestation creates 
incentives for landowners to convert land out of forest and then back into forest in order to 
receive the subsidy.  This entails inefficient expenditures on land conversion, which are 
discouraged by the tax on deforestation in the two-part policy.  A second feature of the policy is 
a requirement that afforested lands remain in forest for a specified period of time.
21 
                                                 
21 This is a common contractual arrangement under voluntary land conservation programs.  For example, CRP 




For each policy scenario, we specify the level of the subsidy and tax, denoted Z.  For land 
moving into forest, the subsidy increases the annual net return to forest, and, for land moving out 
of forest, it reduces the annual net return to non-forest uses.  Suppressing the parcel and time 
subscripts, indexing land uses by j and k, forest use by 1, and the relevant set of non-forest uses 
by -1, Z modifies the estimated transition probabilities  jk P  in the following manner: 
 
  11 1 1 ˆ (, , ) jj Pf N R Z − =+ NR β  (6a) 
 
  11 11 1 1 ˆ (, , ) Pf N R − = − NR Z β  (6b) 
 
  11 1 1 ˆ (, , ) jj Pf N R − = − NR Z β  (6c) 
 
  11 ˆ (, , ) jk jk Pf N R Z − =+ NR β  (6d) 
 
for all j and k not equal to 1, where  ˆ β is a vector of estimated parameters,  1 NR  is the annual net 
return to forest land ,  1 − NR  is a vector of annual net returns to the relevant non-forest uses, and 
Z is a conformable vector with each element equal to Z.  In general, Z has the effect of increasing 
the probability that land transitions into forest and diminishing the probability that it transitions 
out of forest. 
Four issues merit comment.  First, the policy mechanism implicit in our cost simulation 
model provides incentives for land-use changes, rather than for carbon sequestration directly.  If 
the costs of administering these two types of policies are the same, carbon sequestration costs 
will be lower with a policy directly targeting carbon, because it will tend to convert land with the 
lowest costs per ton of carbon, rather than the lowest cost per acre of land.  It is likely, however, 
that the administrative costs of the two approaches would differ significantly.  In general, 
performance measures based on inputs to carbon sequestration — such as quantities of particular 
types of land — would be relatively easy to monitor, compared with the task of monitoring the 
quantity of carbon sequestered, relative to an assumed reference case (Stavins and Richards 
2005).  
Second, the subsidy and tax rates are identical to each other, and remain constant over 
time.  If rates of carbon sequestration differ between land that is afforested and land on which 




equal rates, because it simplifies the policy simulations considerably.  Moreover, analyses of 
efficient and cost-effective climate change mitigation have found that carbon prices should rise 
over time to delay the costs of stabilizing or reducing greenhouse gas concentrations (Nordhaus 
and Boyer 2000; and Goulder and Mathai 2000).  If incentives for carbon sequestration were to 
increase over time, landowners with forward-looking price expectations would, in some 
instances, have incentives to delay carbon sequestration, even if it is profitable to undertake 
immediately (van‘t Veldt and Plantinga 2005).  To be consistent with the econometric model, we 
assume landowners have static price expectations, which implies that significant incentives do 
not exist to delay profitable carbon sequestration; and to simplify the simulations, we treat the 
subsidy/tax rate as constant over time.  
Third, the probabilities in equation (6) are expressed as functions of 1 R , the annualized net 
returns from timber harvests.  Thus, we assume initially that all forested land is eligible for 
timber harvesting, including those lands converted to forest in response to the subsidy.  We also 
consider policies designed to establish permanent forest stands.  In this case, timber harvesting is 
prohibited on afforested lands, but still allowed on land that is forested at the beginning of the 
simulation.  To model this policy, we set  1 R  equal to zero for all transitions of land into forest 
(6a) and all transitions between non-forest uses (6d).  In this case, landowners receive only the 
subsidy Z for afforesting their land.  For land that begins in forest, and hence is ineligible for the 
forestation subsidy,  1 R  is unmodified (6b and 6c). 
Fourth and finally, the modified transition probabilities in (6) are used in the policy 
simulation model to generate estimates of acreage transitions between pairs of land-use 
categories for each level of Z.  Land afforested in response to the subsidy is assumed to remain in 
forest throughout the policy simulation.  Thus, for these forest lands, but not for land originally 
in forest, we set the probability in (6c) to zero.  We also compute a baseline sequence of land-use 
transitions by setting Z in (6) equal to zero.  Naturally, when we compute this baseline, we do not 
require afforested land to remain in forest.  The impact of the policy on carbon sequestration is 
measured relative to the baseline (that is, we net out the change in carbon storage that would 
have occurred in the absence of the policy).  As a practical matter, baseline actions are not 
observable once the policy is in effect, implying that some landowners are subsidized for 
forestation they would have undertaken even without subsidies.  When we conduct the policy 




to retain their land in forest.  But to measure the cost of the policy, we consider foregone net 
returns net of the baseline.  In this way, our estimates measure the economic costs to society, 
rather than the financial costs to the government. 
A policy simulation model, described in Appendix B, is used to simulate the response to 
the incentives for carbon sequestration and to estimate feedback effects on timber and crop prices 
resulting from induced land-use changes.  Aggregating simulated land-use changes at the level of 
each NRI point, the simulation model generates national estimates of acreage transitions among 
land-use categories over long time horizons.  A carbon sink model, described in Appendix C, is 
used to translate the estimated land-use transitions into projected carbon flows.  This model 
accounts for changes in carbon stocks in the relevant biomass, soil, and product categories for 
each of the land uses. 
The carbon sequestration supply function is derived using the procedure discussed by 
Stavins (1999).  For the baseline and each level of the subsidy/tax, we record the areas of land 
afforested and deforested during each period of the simulation.  Net forestation for a given 
subsidy/tax level is defined as the area afforested minus the area deforested, net of this quantity 
in the baseline.  The product of net forestation and the subsidy/tax gives the opportunity cost of 
the policy.  For example, if a payment of $100 is required to induce an extra acre of forestation, 
then this represents the foregone profits associated with the original use of the land. The total 
cost of the policy is computed as the present value of cumulative opportunity costs discounted 
from the midpoint of each five-year interval.  Likewise, we compute cumulative carbon flows 
relative to the baseline and the present value of carbon sequestered.
22 
Total costs and total carbon are computed for each subsidy/tax rate and expressed as 
annualized equivalents.  Marginal costs of carbon sequestration equal the change in costs divided 
by the change in carbon, computed as the ratio of the increment in annualized total costs (moving 
from one subsidy/tax level to the next) to the corresponding increment in annualized total 
carbon.  The supply schedule is constructed by arraying marginal costs against annualized total 
carbon. 
 
                                                 
22 See Richards and Stokes (2004) for an assessment of alternative approaches to intertemporal carbon accounting in 




4. Empirical Results 
 
Simulations are conducted for subsidy/tax rates (values of Z) ranging in $50 increments 
from $0 to $350 per acre.  The two versions of the econometric model — one estimated for the 
period, 1982 to 1997, and the other for the period, 1992 to 1997 — produce very similar carbon 
sequestration supply functions for carbon prices below $200 per ton.  Our discussion below 




We simulate national total quantities of land in six categories of use over time for the 
baseline and policy scenarios.  In the initial year (1997), there are approximately equal areas of 
cropland, rangeland, and forest (about 400 million acres each), while the areas of land in pasture, 
urban, and CRP vary from 33 to 119 million acres (Figure 1).  Under the baseline scenario, the 
largest change is in the area of urban land, which increases from 76 million acres to 495 million 
acres during the 250-year simulation period (Figure 1).  The areas of land in agricultural uses 
(crops, range, pasture, and CRP) decline throughout the simulation period, with cropland 
experiencing the greatest absolute losses.  Forest land increases initially but begins to decline 
after about 50 years.  After 250 years, there is a relatively small net decline in forest area in the 
baseline.  
When a $100 per acre subsidy/tax is introduced, forest area almost doubles during the 
simulation period, from 405 to 754 million acres (Figure 2).  Most of the increase is due to 
increased forestation and, correspondingly, there are larger declines by the end of the simulation 
in the areas of cropland, rangeland, pasture, and CRP.  The increase in urban land area is also 
smaller than in the baseline, as more land is converted to or retained in forest.  The area of 
cropland increases for several decades before declining.  By encouraging conversion of cropland 
to forests, the subsidy/tax has positive effects on net returns to cropland, raising the probability 
that land moves into crops.  Initially, there is a net increase in cropland as more land moves into 
crops from other agricultural uses (pasture, range, and the CRP) than is converted from crops to 
forest and urban.  But as the remaining acres of other agricultural lands decline, flows of land 




While the general pattern of land-use changes is similar at other levels of the subsidy/tax, 
in a given year the increment in forest area declines as the rate of the subsidy/tax increases.
23  In 
addition, at the highest subsidy/tax rates, forest area increases rapidly in early years of the 
simulation before quickly leveling off.  For example, at subsidy/tax rates above $250 per acre, 
the area of forest more than doubles by 25 years into the simulation, but after 25 years, relatively 
little forest is added, because a large share of the land base has already been afforested. 
  There is an increase in carbon storage when agricultural lands are converted to forests or 
land is retained in forest.
24  Figure 3 portrays carbon flows relative to the baseline for selected 
subsidy/tax rates.  There is a small negative carbon flow in the first period of the simulation for 
all levels of the subsidy/tax, because cropland area increases initially under the subsidy/tax 
scenarios due to higher net returns induced by the policy, whereas cropland area declines initially 
in the baseline.  The net increase in cropland results from the conversion of pasture and 
rangeland, producing an immediate and negative flow of carbon (see Appendix C).   
Moving from lower to higher subsidy/tax rates, carbon flows increase, though eventually 
at a diminishing rate, due to the declining induced increment in forest area.  At the highest 
subsidy rates, a scalloped pattern emerges, reflecting the periodicity of harvest and regrowth 
cycles.  On afforested lands, there is a positive flow while trees grow to maturity.  The flow is 
negative at the time of harvest and, then, the cycle repeats itself.  The pattern is most pronounced 
at the highest subsidy/tax rates, because much of the land that will be afforested during the 
simulation is converted during the first years of the simulation.  At lower subsidy/tax levels, the 
increase in forest area is more gradual, and so there is a more even pattern of harvest and 
regrowth.
25 
                                                 
23 This is true except at low levels of the subsidy/tax, where the increments get larger as the subsidy/tax increases.  
As discussed below, this results in our supply function having a convex portion.  
24 In the contiguous United States, the equilibrium level of carbon in cropland soils ranges from a minimum of 17 
tons per acre to a maximum of 36 tons per acre (the mean is 24 tons per acre).  Pasture, range, and CRP lands store 
more carbon than cropland.  The mean equilibrium storage on these lands is 34 tons per acre, with a range from 22 
to 48 tons per acre.  Forests achieve much higher equilibrium levels of carbon storage.  If never harvested, mature 
forests in the contiguous United States reach levels of carbon storage ranging from 86 to 355 tons per acre, with a 
mean of 140 tons per acre.  Harvested forests store less carbon.  The average forest stand harvested on a 30-year 
rotation will hold 61 tons of carbon at the start of the rotation and 77 tons by the end of the rotation.  Harvesting 
releases only some of the carbon in the forest.  Between 20% and 45% of the carbon in the merchantable portion of 
trees is sequestered long term in wood products and landfills. 
25 For most of the simulation, the flows trend upward, due largely to the addition of new forests over time, but after 




The land-use change and carbon flow results are combined to produce a marginal cost 
function for forest carbon sequestration.  Econometric estimation and respective simulations 
were carried out both with the full set of three transitions over the period 1982-1997 and with the 
final transition of 1992-1997.  As highlighted above, the share of land in urban uses has 
increased monotonically and dramatically, suggesting significant structural change.  Because the 
simulations are forward-looking and need to be carried out over very long time horizons, we 
employ the more recent 1992-1997 econometric estimates and related land-use simulations in our 
calculations of the carbon sequestration marginal cost function.
26  This is portrayed in figure 4, 
where the solid line indicates the supply function for our basic scenario (where the harvesting of 
wood products is allowed). 
Although the marginal cost function is convex throughout most of its range, it is concave 
at low levels (below $70/ton).  This is a consequence of the logistic specification used in the 
underlying econometric model.  Recall that the vast majority of plots in the NRI sample remains 
in the same use over time; in other words, there is a low probability that land transitions out of its 
current use.  At low marginal costs (low subsidy/tax), the logistic is a convex function of its 
arguments — net returns and land quality.  As forest net returns increase in the policy scenarios, 
there is a range of subsidy/tax rates for which the land moving into forest increases at an 
increasing rate, implying that marginal costs of carbon sequestration increase at a decreasing rate 
at low levels of the subsidy/tax.
27 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
amount of carbon is stored in solid wood products and gradually released over time.  This negative flow is offset for 
most of the simulation by the addition of new forest lands which generate positive flows, but once forest area 
stabilizes, the negative carbon flows from the product pools become apparent.  The second explanation is associated 
with forest lands that are never harvested (see Appendix C).  The carbon in unharvested forests reaches a maximum 
level after 12 decades.  The zero flows in unharvested forests result in a diminished aggregate carbon flow.  At the 
end of the simulation the flows drop to lower levels for the highest subsidy/tax rates.  At higher rates, the area of 
forest more quickly reaches its highest level.  As a result, the negative flows from the product pools become 
apparent sooner, and zero flows in unharvested forests occur earlier.  
26 It should be noted, however, that the results from both sets of econometric estimations and related simulations are 
similar within the range of the data, that is, with marginal costs of carbon sequestration that are within the range of 
historical experience of variance in timber returns. 
27 The convexity of the marginal cost curve at higher marginal costs is not due to passing the inflection point in the 
logistic probability curve.  At higher subsidy/tax levels, most of the land gets converted to forest in the earliest 
periods, leaving progressively less land to be converted in subsequent periods.  The constraint on available land 
leads to decreasing incremental increases in total cumulative net forestation (and carbon sequestration), despite the 






In deriving the main results, we assume all forest lands (including lands converted to or 
retained in forest in response to policy) are periodically harvested.  Another realistic policy 
scenario involves a contractual stipulation that prohibits timber harvests on lands enrolled in a 
carbon sequestration program.  A prohibition on harvesting may increase the discounted value of 
carbon sequestered, because negative carbon flows resulting from harvesting are avoided.
28 But 
harvesting restrictions also reduce or even eliminate revenues received by landowners, increasing 
the financial incentives needed to increase forest area.  Thus, a priori, the net effect on the 
marginal costs of carbon sequestration of allowing timber harvesting is ambiguous. 
Therefore, we also conduct simulations for a no-harvesting scenario.  We find that 
prohibiting harvesting lowers the marginal costs of sequestration (Figure 4).  The key reason is 
that at each level of the subsidy/tax, total forest area is greater under the no-harvesting scenario.  
Although harvesting restrictions reduce the amount of land enrolled in the carbon sequestration 
program, they also result in higher timber prices relative to the corresponding harvesting case, 
which helps to retain existing (that is, non-program) lands in forest.  In addition, at a 5% discount 
rate, the per-acre discounted carbon flows are greater under the no-harvesting scenario.  In sum, 
more forest land outside the program and more carbon sequestration on program lands combine 
to produce lower marginal costs when harvesting is prohibited. 
We also examined the sensitivity of the carbon sequestration supply function to 
alternative social rates of discount.  In the econometric and simulation analysis reported above, 
the private net returns to forest and urban uses are annualized using a 5% rate (the returns to 
other land uses are measured in annual terms).  We compare three alternatives (1%, 3%, and 7%) 
to the benchmark rate of 5%.  Higher discount rates lower the present value of both costs and 
carbon flows.  Hence, in theory, changes in the discount rate have an ambiguous effect on unit 
costs of the policy (the ratio of annualized dollars to annualized tons of carbon).  Empirically, we 
find that higher discount rates increase unit costs, and decrease annualized carbon flows.  Thus, 
the marginal cost curve for carbon sequestration shifts up as we move from lower to higher 
discount rates.  For sequestration of 500 million tons of carbon per year, the marginal (average) 
                                                 
28 With harvesting, some carbon is fixed in solid wood products and landfills for long periods of time.  As a result, it 
is possible for the total amount of carbon sequestered to be greater under harvesting than no-harvesting regimes 




cost per ton rises from $8 ($4) to $41 ($20), $93 ($53) and $164 ($102) at discount rates of 1%, 
3%, 5% and 7%, respectively. 
 
Comparison with Results from Other Studies 
 
  We compare our marginal cost estimates with those from previous studies of carbon 
sequestration in forests (Figure 5) and carbon abatement (Figure 6).
29  Over most of the range of 
carbon prices considered in previous forest carbon sequestration studies, our cost estimates are 
higher than those obtained using optimization models (Adams et al. 1993; and Callaway and 
McCarl 1996) and bottom-up engineering cost methods (Richards et al. 1993).  Comparing our 
estimates with those from the earlier econometric study by Stavins (1999), we find similar costs 
at low carbon sequestration levels, but lower costs at higher carbon sequestration levels.  In 
particular, the Stavins curve becomes close to vertical by about 600 million tons of carbon per 
year, whereas our curve is still relatively flat at this point.  Part of the reason for this difference is 
the fact that Stavins extrapolates his econometric results from the Mississippi Delta region to 
U.S. farm acreage totaling 551 million acres, including cropland and pasture (422 and 129 
million acres, respectively).  In the present study, crop and pasture acreage are somewhat lower, 
but rangeland is included, yielding a total of 933 million acres of privately-owned agricultural 
land (cropland, pasture, rangeland, and CRP) available for conversion to forest.  As indicated in 
figures 1 and 2, a substantial amount of the increase in forest area in our simulations is due to 
conversion of rangeland to forest.  Stavins’ (1999) econometric model was fitted to data 
exclusively of transitions between cropland and forest.
30
 
Finally, we compare the marginal costs of forest carbon sequestration with estimates of 
energy-based carbon abatement.
31  For estimates below $100 per ton, our estimates are 
comparable to those of Jorgensen and Wilcoxen, Manne and Richels, and OECD/Green — 
particularly if the initial part of our curve is treated as linear — and higher than those in Goulder.  
                                                 
29 The marginal cost estimates from the previous studies are reported and discussed in Stavins (1999).  For a 
synthesis of forest carbon sequestration marginal cost estimates, see:  Stavins and Richards (2005). 
30 An additional explanation for the difference is that the 36 counties examined in the Stavins (1999) study may 
simply not be representative of the United States along relevant dimensions. 
31 The abatement cost estimates are derived from estimates in the Energy Modeling Forum (1995).  See Stavins 




For costs above $100 per ton, our estimates are lower than the abatement studies considering 
costs in this range, namely OECD/Green and Manne and Richels.     
Given the relative positions of the supply functions, the results suggest that forest-based 
carbon sequestration merits consideration as part of a cost-effective portfolio of domestic U.S. 
climate change strategies.  Consider, for example, a domestic program that would bring U.S. 
annual greenhouse gas emissions 7% below 1990 levels over the period, 2008 to 2012, as would 
be required by the Kyoto Protocol.  This would entail a reduction of about 573 million short tons 
of carbon in the year 2010.
32  To compare the abatement and sequestration cost estimates 
explicitly, we fit a function to the point estimates from the abatement studies (the dotted line in 
Figure 6).
33  Our analysis indicates that if cost-effective emission reductions
34 in the United 
States on the scale proposed under the Kyoto Protocol were to be achieved entirely through 
domestic actions (forest-based sequestration and/or energy-based abatement activities), 33% of 
the reduction would be achieved through forest-based sequestration (or up to 44% if the lower 
portion of our curve were linearized to join the convex section, the dashed line in Figure 6). 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this econometric analysis of carbon sequestration costs, six major land uses were 
modeled, detailed micro-data of land use and land quality were employed that are comprehensive 
of the contiguous United States, and key commodity prices were treated as endogenous in the 
simulations of the carbon sequestration supply function.  We compared the estimated carbon 
sequestration supply function that resulted with ones from previous studies, and found that over 
the range of carbon prices considered in most studies, our marginal cost estimates are greater 
than those from engineering cost analyses and sectoral optimization models.  Because our cost 
estimates are derived from landowners’ actual behavior regarding disposition of their lands, they 
may reflect such factors as option values associated with delaying irreversible land conversion, 
                                                 
32 Estimated U.S. net greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 were 1,555 million short tons of carbon equivalent (US EPA 
2004).  Projected 2010 energy-based carbon emissions are about 1,972 million short tons (US DOE 2004) and 
projected other greenhouse emissions minus sequestration removals are 47 million short tons of carbon equivalent 
(US DOS 2002). 
33 A quadratic form was chosen so as to minimize the Akaike (1974) information criterion (AIC). 
34 The cost-effective portfolio equalizes the marginal costs of sequestration and abatement at the level that achieves 




liquidity constraints, and unobserved benefits and costs of alternative land uses.  Our results are 
consistent with previous econometric estimates that were based on more limited data sets. 
We find lower marginal costs of carbon sequestration when timber harvesting is 
prohibited on lands enrolled in the carbon sequestration program.  Marginal costs fall because 
the additional present value costs of enrolling lands on which harvesting is prohibited are more 
than outweighed by the additional present value carbon sequestered.  This result is reinforced by 
endogenous price effects.  Restrictions on timber harvesting on enrolled lands raise timber 
prices, creating incentives for landowners to retain existing (non-program) lands in forest.   
The national scope of our study allows us to compare directly our estimates of the 
marginal costs of carbon sequestration with estimates of costs from energy-based carbon 
abatement analyses.  We find that the estimated carbon sequestration supply function is roughly 
similar to the central tendency of the carbon abatement supply function, indicating that about a 
third of the U.S. target under the Kyoto Protocol would be cost-effectively achieved by 
employing forest-based sequestration policies, in addition to energy-based carbon abatement 
strategies.  At a minimum, forest-based carbon sequestration merits consideration as part of a 







Mean, Standard Deviation by Year
 a  Variables   Level   1982 1987 1992 1997 
0.296 0.286 0.269 0.266  Land use is crops 
(1=yes, 0=no)  NRI point  (0.456) (0.452) (0.443) (0.441) 
0.092 0.089 0.089 0.084  Land use is pasture 
(1=yes, 0=no)  NRI point  (0.289) (0.285) (0.284) (0.278) 
0.282 0.284 0.284 0.286  Land use is forest 
(1=yes, 0=no)  NRI point  (0.450) (0.451) (0.451) (0.451) 
0.036 0.041 0.046 0.054  Land in urban use 
(1=yes, 0=no)  NRI point  (0.187) (0.197) (0.209) (0.225) 
0.293 0.289 0.287 0.286  Land use is range 
(1=yes, 0=no)  NRI point  (0.455) (0.453) (0.452) (0.452) 
0 0.010  0.024  0.023  Land use is CRP 
(1=yes, 0=no)  NRI point  0 (0.098)  (0.153)  (0.024) 
0.232 0.232 0.231 0.153)  Land Capability Class 
1 - 2  (1=yes, 0=no)  NRI point  (0.422) (0.422) (0.422) (0.421) 
0.347 0.347 0.347 0.347  Land Capability Class 
  
3 – 4 (1=yes, 0=no)  NRI point  (0.476) (0.476) (0.476) (0.476) 
0.215 0.214 0.215 0.215  Land Capability Class 
  
5 – 6 (1=yes, 0=no)  NRI point  (0.410) (0.410) (0.410) (0.410) 
0.206 0.207 0.207 0.207  Land Capability Class 
  
7 – 8 (1=yes, 0=no)  NRI point  (0.404) (0.404) (0.405) (0.405) 
58.4 73.8 82.8  Crop net returns 
($/acre/year) 
b  County 
(38.4) (45.0) (48.2) 
n/a 
16.1 7.9 12.7  Pasture net returns 
($/acre/year)  County 
(11.3) (8.0)  (9.0) 
n/a 
6.0 9.0 17.2  Forest net returns 
($/acre/year)  County 
(5.9) (9.0) (17.1) 
n/a 
1,946 2,389 2,349  Urban net returns 
($/acre/year)  County 
(1,946) (2,389) (2,349) 
n/a 
11.2 10.3 10.4  Range net returns 
($/acre/year)  County 
(10.1) (8.9)  (9.3) 
n/a 
 
a Point-level variables are indicator variables weighted by NRI-point acreage weights.  Net returns are 
lagged five-year averages in 1990 dollars (deflated by the producer price index for all commodities) 
weighted by the county acreage in each land use given by the NRI. 
b Equals the sum of the market-component of crop net returns plus direct government payments 










Final Land Use and Time Period 
b 
_____Crops_____ _____Forest_____ _____Pasture____ _____Range_____ _____Urban_____ 
Initial 
Land 
Use  1982-97 1992-97 1982-97 1992-97 1982-97 1992-97 1982-97 1992-97 1982-97 1992-97
0.192**  0.011**  0.332**  0.310** 0.090** 0.183** 0.477**  0.376**  0.156**  0.342**  Crops 
(0.005)  (0.001)  (0.024)  (0.043)  (0.017)  (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.048) (0.005) (0.016) 
0.178**  0.295** -0.000  0.001  0.091  -0.000 0.235** 0.232 0.511**  0.792**  Forest 
(0.039)  (0.064) (0.000) (0.055) (0.179) (0.000) (0.033) (0.330) (0.010) (0.058) 
0.306**  0.341**  0.023*  0.005  -0.005  -0.012  1.373** 1.042** 0.314** 0.331**  Pasture 
(0.012)  (0.022) (0.011) (0.027) (0.003) (0.008) (0.033) (0.050) (0.014) (0.026) 
0.072  0.065 0.064** 0.127  0.159  0.399  -0.002 -0.001 0.385**  0.419**  Range 
(0.069)  (0.229) (0.023) (0.906) (0.700) (0.417) (0.001) (0.971) (0.036) (0.031) 
 
a Elasticities are evaluated at the means of the data and are the percentage change in the probability of choosing the final land 
use, conditional on being in the initial use, for a 1% change in the net returns to the final use.  Standard errors, in parentheses, are 
estimated using the Delta Method (Greene 2000).  * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels.  
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Appendix A:  Data Description 
35 
 
 Land  Use:  Land-use data is from USDA’s National Resources Inventory (NRI).  “Crops” 
include row and close-grown crops, fallow, haylands, pasture in rotation with crops, vineyards, 
orchards, and nurseries.  “Pasture” includes land managed for introduced forage.  “Range” 
includes land with native or introduced forage suitable for grazing that receives only limited 
management. “Forests” are lands at least one acre in size and 100 feet in width that are least 10% 
stocked with trees with the potential to reach 13 feet at maturity (equivalent to a canopy cover of 
at least 25%).  “Urban” areas include land in residential, industrial, commercial, or institutional 
uses, as well as parcels below ten acres, such as small parks, that are also completely surrounded 
by urban lands.  This definition excludes roads and other lands used for transportation in non-
metropolitan areas, as these are separately identified by the NRI.  
 
  Cropland Net Returns: Estimated annual cropland net returns per acre consist of two 
components: a weighted average of the net returns for 21 major crops and total Federal farm 
program payments, excluding payments from the Conservation and Wetlands Reserve Programs.
  
We used state-level marketing-year-average prices and county-level yields from the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) for 21 major crops.  Cash costs at the state and regional 
levels, respectively, are from the Census of Agriculture and Economic Research Service (ERS).  
County acreages from NASS and the Census of Agriculture provided weights.  County-level 
estimates of total Federal direct farm program payments per acre are from the Census of 
Agriculture and include receipts from deficiency payments, support price payments, indemnity 
programs, disaster payments, and soil and water conservation projects. 
 
 Pasture  Net  Returns:  Annual net returns per acre for pasture were estimated using yields 
from the National Cooperative Soil Survey (NCSS) times the state price for “other hay” from 
NASS minus costs for hay and other field crops from the Census of Agriculture. 
 
  Range Net Returns: Annual net returns per acre for rangeland were estimated with forage 
yields from NCSS multiplied by state-level grazing rates reported by ERS. 
                                                 





 Forest  Net  Returns:  Annual net returns per acre from forestry were constructed by 
annualizing at a 5% interest rate the estimated net present value of a weighted average of 
sawtimber revenues from different forest types.  State-level stumpage prices were gathered from 
state and Federal agencies and private data services.  Regional timber yields for different forest 
types were obtained from Richard Birdsey of the U.S. Forest Service.  Regional replanting and 
management costs were derived from Moulton and Richards (1990).  An infinite stream of 
timber revenues for each forest type was estimated using the optimal rotation age from the 
Faustmann formula.  County acreage and sawtimber output data from the Forest Inventory and 
Analysis (FIA) and Timber Product Output (TPO) surveys of the U.S. Forest Service provided 
weights for averaging across individual forest types and species, respectively. 
 
  Urban Net Returns: Annual urban net returns were estimated as the median value of a 
recently-developed one-acre parcel used for a single-family home, less the value of structures, 
annualized at a 5% interest rate.  Median county-level prices for single-family homes were 
constructed from the Census of Population and Housing Public Use Microdata Samples and the 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) House Price Index.   Regional data on 
lot sizes and land value relative to structures were from the Characteristics of New Housing 






















Appendix B: Policy Simulation Model  
 
The policy simulation model is used to estimate land-use changes that occur in response 
to incentives for carbon sequestration.  The simulation is conducted at the NRI point level, 
indexed by i, beginning in 1997, where  {0,1,...} t =  references the start times of five-year 
intervals.  Based on the sampling design, each point is associated with a certain number of acres.  
We define  ijt A  as the number of acres associated with point i in use j at time t.  In the initial 
period, each point is in one of the six uses as indicated in the 1997 NRI data.  Thus,  0 ij A  equals 
the acres represented by point i if the point is in use j in time 0, and equals 0 otherwise.  Given a 
sequence of transition probabilities, we can estimate how the land will be distributed across the 
six use categories at each time in the future.  As per equation (2), the probability that land 
represented by point i transitions from use j to k during the interval beginning at t is denoted ijkt P .   
We express the land at point i that converts from use j to k during the interval beginning 
in t as  ijkt ijkt ijt TA P A =⋅ .  The acres represented by point i in use j at time t+1 are given by, 
  1 ijt ikjt ikjt ikt kk AT A P A + = =⋅ ∑ ∑ , (B.1) 
 
reflecting the first-order Markov structure of the model. 
The transition probabilities in the initial period (t=0) are estimated with the net returns 
observed in 1997 and a given value of Z.  With the initial acres 0 ij A , we can estimate the acres in 
each use in period 1 using (B.1).  The induced change in land use implies a change in the supply 
of land-based commodities and services and, hence, changes in related prices and net returns.  
We model these endogenous price effects for forest and cropland, and assume that net returns to 
pasture, range, urban, and the CRP remain constant in the simulation.  We are justified in 
ignoring price effects for pasture and CRP, because these uses represent small and declining 
shares of the land base in the baseline scenario.  This implies that price adjustments would have 
small effects on the total flow of land into forest under the policy.  Range is a major component 
of the land base (about 30% initially), but we were unable to find any data on markets 




for transitions into urban uses were found to be insensitive to changes in urban net returns,
36 
indicating that these probabilities would tend to remain the same with endogenous price effects. 
Consistent with the model of landowner behavior underlying the econometric analysis, 
crop and forest commodities are supplied inelastically.  Thus, we can use crop and timber yields 
(per acre), to translate land-use changes into output changes.  After aggregating output changes 
appropriately, corresponding price changes are computed using own-price demand elasticities 
estimated in previous econometric studies.
37  Changes in cropland area result in immediate 
changes in crop output, since crops are assumed to be harvested in the year they are planted.  In 
the case of forests, timber harvests will be delayed for a period of years while the forest stand 
matures.  We assume harvests on afforested lands are delayed for one optimal rotation period, 
after which time the forest is “fully regulated” and provides a constant annual timber flow.
38  All 
land originally in forest (at t=0) is also assumed to be fully regulated.
39  When these lands are 
converted to non-forest uses, we assume that 20% of the timber is merchantable.    
After computing the price changes resulting from the land-use changes between periods 0 
and 1, we form new measures of net returns in period 1.  We apply the national or regional 
percentage price change to the county-level prices used to compute net returns.  With the period 
1 net returns, we recalculate the transition probabilities and repeat the procedure.  This stage of 
the simulation ends when the crop and forest net returns have converged (that is, period-to-
period changes in prices are near zero).  The converged net returns are equilibrium values that 
                                                 
36 While urban net returns had a small impact on the probabilities of conversions to urban uses, this impact far 
exceeded the effects from changes in net returns to the other land uses.  
37 For crop commodities, we use a national-level demand elasticity for raw food inputs by food processors (Goodwin 
and Brester 1995).  We apply this elasticity (-0.661) separately to each of the twenty-five crop commodities in our 
model.  For timber, we use demand elasticities for seven timber production regions — Pacific Northwest (-0.300), 
Pacific Southwest (-0.497), Rocky Mountains (-0.054), North Central (-0.141), Northeast (-0.029), South Central (-
0.193), Southeast (-0.285) — from the Timber Assessment Market Model (Adams and Haynes 1980).  These 
elasticities apply to a composite timber type representative of the species found within the region.  In general, we 
would expect the mixes of crop and timber types to change in response to price changes.  However, we assume for 
simplicity that the crop and timber type shares remain constant over time.  
38 Specifically, if t
* is the optimal rotation length, then there is an equal area of forest in each age category in the 
interval [0, t
*].  Each year, timber of age t
*, or 1/ t
* of the forest area, is harvested.
  
39 The fully regulated assumption overstates the timber supply from private forests, since non-industrial landowners, 
who own almost 80% of private forest in the U.S., frequently manage their lands for non-timber outputs such as 
recreation (Birch 1996).  To account for these alternative objectives, we assume that a fixed percentage of forest 
land area in each timber production region is never harvested, while the remaining forest is harvested as described 
above. The no-harvest percentages  are determined by calibrating the model to regional timber harvest data for 1997.  




reflect all of the anticipated supply adjustments in agricultural and forest commodity markets.  
This process is atemporal, since it represents an instantaneous adjustment to the new market 
equilibrium after the introduction of the subsidy/tax.  For this reason, we hold urban land 
constant during this stage of the simulation.  Urban land will increase over time with factors such 
as population growth — as it does in the second stage of the simulation discussed below — but 
should not affect the immediate adjustment in net returns to cropland and forests. 
In the second stage of the simulation, we compute the time path of land-use changes.  
Specifically, we recalculate the transition probabilities for the initial period using the converged 
net returns for cropland and forests, the associated value of the subsidy/tax, and the observed net 
returns for the other uses.  Beginning with the initial acres in each use ( 0 ij A ), we use (B.1) to 
compute the sequence of land-use transitions ( ijkt TA ) through time.  Unlike in the first stage of 
































Appendix C: Carbon Sink Model 
 
  In a forest, carbon is stored in biomass (living components of trees and plants) and in the 
floor litter and soils.  Timber harvests convert some of this carbon back to CO2, but much of the 
carbon in the merchantable biomass is captured in wood products for decades after harvest.  On 
agricultural lands, soils are the principal carbon sink, because little carbon in the harvested 
biomass is permanently sequestered.  We assume that no carbon is stored in urban lands, though 
urban lands have trees, and some residual carbon may be stored in urban soils. 
 
Carbon flows when land remains in the same use. 
   Agricultural soils become saturated with carbon if the land remains in the same use for 
long periods.  For all land that begins and remains in agricultural use (cropland, pasture, 
rangeland, and CRP), we assume the soil carbon is at this equilibrium level, equal to the initial 
soil carbon levels for cropland and pasture converted to forest.  We assume that range and CRP 
lands have the same equilibrium carbon levels as pasture.
40   
  As discussed above, land that begins in forests is assumed to have a fully regulated 
structure.
41  For forests that are never harvested, carbon accumulates in the stand until it reaches 
an equilibrium level (assumed to be at 120 years).  For harvested forests, carbon in the 
merchantable biomass is processed into primary wood products (e.g., paper, lumber, and 
plywood), then transformed into end-use products (e.g., newspapers, housing), and remains 
sequestered in end-use products or is disposed in landfills.  Plantinga and Birdsey (1993) provide 
estimates (by regions and timber types) of the remaining share of merchantable carbon at the 
start of each decade after harvest.  We assume the last share reported (at 50 years) applies in 
subsequent years.  Except for soil carbon, all carbon in non-merchantable biomass (e.g., 
branches), understory vegetation, and floor litter is released as emissions at the harvest time.  The 
soil carbon reverts to the level specified by Birdsey (1992) for a forest after a clearcut harvest.  
From there, carbon accumulates with new forest growth until the rotation age is reached again. 
                                                 
40 Estimates of equilibrium soil carbon for cropland and pasture are from Birdsey (1992), who provides estimates of 
carbon stored in forest stands for different regions, forest types, and previous land uses. 
41 We match the Birdsey (1992) forest carbon data to our land-use estimates, based on state-level forest composition.  
Thus, the carbon yield from each acre of forest land within a state is a weighted average of type-specific yields, 





Carbon flows when land changes uses 
When land moves from cropland into another agricultural use (pasture, rangeland, and 
CRP), there is a gradual transition from the lower equilibrium soil carbon level to a higher level.  
Based on results from the Century model (Conant, Paustian, and Elliot 2000), the transition takes 
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=
∆= − ∑ , (C.1) 
where 
CP
n C ∆  is the cumulative change in carbon n years following the land-use change and PER 
is the precipitation to evaporation ratio.  State-specific values of PER were taken from the 
Century model database.  When land moves from pasture, rangeland, or CRP to cropland, it is 
usually tilled in preparation for planting.  This releases soil carbon, and we assume an 
instantaneous drop from the first soil carbon level to the next.  Likewise, we assume an 
immediate loss of soil carbon when agricultural land is converted to urban use.   
  When agricultural land is converted to forest, carbon accumulates in the soils, floor litter, 
and biomass.  To model these flows, we use the corresponding carbon yield tables from Birdsey 
(1992) for forests established on cropland and pasture.  Timber harvests are handled as described 
above.  When a forest is converted to cropland, pasture, or urban use, there is an immediate 
adjustment to the new equilibrium soil carbon level, again reflecting disturbances to the soils.  
Consistent with the policy simulation model, 20% of the merchantable biomass is assumed to be 
manufactured into wood products, while the carbon in the remaining merchantable biomass, non-
merchantable biomass, and floor litter is immediately released as emissions. 